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Center for Internet Security Benchmark for FreeRADIUS v1.0

Aug 2, 2007

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Table of Contents

Introduction.....	6
Applicability	6
1 Operating System Level Configuration	7
1.1 OS Hardening.....	7
1.2 Non-privileged Radius Account	7
1.3 Logging Partition	7
1.4 Ownership of raddb.....	7
1.5 Permissions for raddb	8
1.6 Client Configuration File Ownership.....	8
1.7 Client Configuration File Permissions.....	8
1.8 Dedicated System.....	8
1.9 Restricted Network Access	9
2 The radiusd.conf Configuration File.....	10
2.1 Enable Logging	10
2.2 Log All Authentications.....	10
2.3 Disable Core Dumps	10
2.4 Allow Password Spaces	11
2.5 Max Attributes	11
2.6 Reject Delay	11
2.7 No Server Status	12
2.8 Proxy Request	12
2.9 Client IP Address	12
2.10 Unique Client Secret.....	12
2.11 Strong Shared Secrets	13
2.12 Users File Passwords	13
2.13 User Password Storage	13
2.14 User Network Authentication	13
Revision History	15
Additional Resources	15

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Introduction

This benchmark is intended to assist administrators in securing FreeRadius, the most popular open source RADIUS server used to provide network access control, including authentication, authorization and accounting. RADIUS stands for Remote Authentication Dial In User Service, published as RFC 2865 and RFC 2866. Although RADIUS was originally used for dial-up network access control, it's also commonly used for other network access controls, such as DSL, 802.1X, wireless 802.11, and VoIP. Of course RADIUS servers are just one part of a typical network infrastructure, and their security depends in part on the security of the rest of the infrastructure. However, this benchmark will focus primarily on the secure configuration of the FreeRadius server.

Applicability

While the majority of the recommendations and steps outlined in this document apply to most Unix systems, it should be noted that specific paths and some syntax may vary for some Unix platforms so the reader is encouraged to be familiar with the differences specific to their individual platforms. The provided configurations have been tested using FreeRadius 1.1.3 on Red Hat Fedora Core 6. The audience for the document is at the level of an experienced system administrator, with some specific experience in administering the FreeRadius server. The configuration and security controls provided have been developed through a consensus effort of best practices recommended by a majority of participating security experts.

1 Operating System Level Configuration

The following specifies the recommended operating system level installation, configuration and permissions for FreeRADIUS

1.1 OS Hardening

Security of the RADIUS service absolutely depends on having a secured operating system as a foundation.

Harden the operating system using appropriate CIS benchmark from <http://www.cisecurity.org/>

1.2 Non-privileged Radius Account

There must be no other usage of the user account except for running the radiusd server.

Discussion:

Configure radiusd to execute under a dedicated non-privileged user and group account, by ensuring that user and group are configured in the radiusd.conf file.

Example:

```
user = radiusd
group = radiusd
```

1.3 Logging Partition

In the event that attacks or even normal events causing excessive logs to fill up the file system other critical system partitions which contain system executables and configuration files should not be affected.

Discussion:

Do not use the root file system partition for the radiusd log file. Instead use a separate file system dedicated to logging and other run time data storage. The /var file system is typically used for logging, and should be it's own partition.

1.4 Ownership of raddb

The radius client.conf file typically contains clear text shared secrets to authenticate client systems and devices and therefore must have minimal ownership and access.

Discussion:

The /etc/raddb directory or the equivalent directory containing the freeradius configuration files must be owned by root, as well as all files contained therein.

1.5 Permissions for raddb

Allowing write access to Radius DB directory would allow deletion and replacement of the configuration files to undermine the entire security of the server configuration.

Discussion:

The /etc/raddb directory and the configuration files in the directory must be read-only for the radiusd group with no-access for other.

Example:

```
drwxr-x--- 3 root radiusd /etc/raddb/
```

1.6 Client Configuration File Ownership

The system default RADIUS client configuration file must be protected from modification to prevent configuration attacks on local clients.

Discussion:

The radius clients configuration file, must be owned by root with a group of radiusd.

1.7 Client Configuration File Permissions

The system default RADIUS client configuration file must be protected from modification to prevent configuration attacks on local clients.

Discussion:

The radiusd clients.conf file must not be readable only by the radiusd server and by root.

Example:

```
-rw-r----- 1 root radiusd clients.conf
```

1.8 Dedicated System

FreeRadius should be installed on a system dedicated to the directory and authentication services, to reduce the risk of potential vulnerabilities in other services jeopardizing the server.

Discussion:

System must be dedicated to running the RADIUS service, only administrative services like SSH and other closely related authentication services, should be running on the same system.

1.9 Restricted Network Access

Restricting network access with IP filtering to those just those systems or networks that require access, reduces the risk of the most common attacks.

Discussion:

Restrict network access using host based IP filtering to the minimal networks or systems requiring access. This may be accomplished with tcpwrappers, iptables, bpf or ipf depending on the platform

2 The radiusd.conf Configuration File

The following configuration directives are made to the radius.conf configuration file typically found in /etc/raddb/

2.1 Enable Logging

The log files must also be frequently monitored to be an effective security control.

Discussion:

The log directory and log file must be configured to a suitable directory where the FreeRadius logs will be rotated and monitored. Typically the directory is /var/log/radius/.

Example:

```
logdir = ${localstatedir}/log/radius log_file =  
${logdir}/radius.log
```

2.2 Log All Authentications

The log files needs to be monitored as a large number of authentication failures maybe indicate a password guessing attack, or at least constitutes an event warranting some investigation.

Discussion:

All authentications must be logged, while the password itself should not be logged whether the password was valid or invalid password.

Example:

```
log_auth = yes log_auth_badpass = no log_auth_goodpass = no
```

2.3 Disable Core Dumps

Core dumps are disabled, since sensitive information such as passwords would be available in the core dump file.

Discussion:

For productions server the creation of core dumps must be disabled.

Example:

```
allow_core_dumps = no
```

2.4 Allow Password Spaces

Eliminating spaces from passwords would decrease the password complexity and increase the risk of password guessing.

Discussion:

Spaces must be allowed in passwords by ensuring that the `nospace_pass` is set to the value of `no`.

Example:

```
nospace_pass = no
```

2.5 Max Attributes

The intent is to mitigate a denial of service attack using an excessive number of attributes.

Discussion:

In the security section of the `radiusd.conf` file the maximum number of attributes allow should be set a number greater than zero, which is high enough to allow all legitimate requests. A limit of 200 should be plenty for most cases.

Example:

```
max_attributes = 200
```

2.6 Reject Delay

The purpose of delaying reject packets is to significantly slow down password guessing and DoS attacks. Setting a value to high may introduce confusion with timeout issues for clients.

Discussion

In the Security section the `reject_delay` item configures the number of seconds to delay before sending a reject packet. The setting should be set to a value of 1 or slightly higher, 2 is recommended.

Example:

```
reject_delay = 2
```

2.7 No Server Status

Server Status request and keep-alive techniques are considered useless and possibly harmful. See: <http://www.freeradius.org/rfc/rfc2865.html#Keep-Alives>

Discussion:

The server status configuration should be set to 'no' to disable status responses which includes the server uptime.

Example:

```
status_server = no
```

2.8 Proxy Request

Also remember to comment out any include of the proxy configuration.

Discussion:

Unless the Radius Server is acting as proxy to other radius servers, the proxy_request directive must be disabled.

Example:

```
proxy_requests = no ## $INCLUDE ${confdir}/proxy.conf
```

2.9 Client IP Address

Usage of a host name is not recommended as it leaves the service subject to DNS attacks.

Discussion:

Each Radius Client Network Access System (NAS) must be configured with its individual IP Address rather than a network ID.

Example:

```
client 10.2.3.4 { . . . }
```

2.10 Unique Client Secret

Do NOT use the example secret. Having each client configured with a unique secret is worth the extra work to ensure that compromise of one doesn't necessarily compromise the whole.

Discussion:

Each client Network Access System must be configured with a unique shared secret.

Example:

```
client 10.2.3.4 { secret = foz4c0wce-ufBojto=nvoxxxxc9owgOoghit~p
```

2.11 Strong Shared Secrets

The security of RADIUS depends heavily on the strength of the shared secret. Usage of a password generator is helpful. Old NAS clients limited the length to 16 and should be upgraded.

Discussion:

The shared secret string for each client must be at least 22 characters, but not more than 31 characters. The secret must not use dictionary words, or guessable patterns or variations of words. It should include a variety of special, numeric and alphabetic characters.

2.12 Users File Passwords

Clear text user password storage in the user file increases the risk of a user password disclosure.

Discussion:

Passwords must NOT be stored in the Radius users text file in clear text using the User-Password attribute.

2.13 User Password Storage

Storage of user passwords in clear text or with reversible encryption increases the risk of password disclosure via directly attacking the password storage.

Discussion:

User passwords must be stored using a secure one-way hash regardless of whether the storage is a flat file, database or directory service.

2.14 User Network Authentication

TLS configurations must be configured to require strong ciphers. Such as the example LDAP TLS configuration:

TLSCipherSuite HIGH:MEDIUM:!ADH:-SSLv2 TLSCipherSuite
HIGH:MEDIUM:!ADH:-SSLv2

Discussion:

If a directory service is used to authenticate users, a secure protocol with at least 128 bit or stronger encryption must be used. Compliant protocols include PEAP, EAP-MCCHAPv2, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and LDAP with TLS. See the table below for details.

Authentication Protocol	Recommended	Comments
PAP	NO	Clear text passwords over the net protected only by weak usage of MD5 hash
CHAP	NO	Weak, requires clear text password storage
MSCHAP	NO	Requires Clean Text Storage of Passwords
EAP-MD5	NO	Vulnerable to password dictionary and guessing attack
EAP-LEAP	NO	Vulnerable to password dictionary and guessing attack.
EAP-TLS	YES	Uses client TLS certificates, very strong protection with proper certificate management.
EAP-TTLS	YES	Uses client passwords or other authentication tunneled in TLS
PEAPv0 aka EAP-MSCHAPV2	YES	Compatible with MS implementation, not with Cisco's Implementation
PEAPv1 aka EAP-GTC	YES	Not supported natively on Windows.
LDAP with TLS	YES	

Revision History

Original Version 0.9 Feb-Apr 2007 -- Editor Ralph Durkee
Consensus updates 1.0 Aug 2007 -- Editor Ralph Durkee

Additional Resources

FreeRadius Wiki documentation - <http://wiki.freeradius.org>

How-to on FreeRadius with OpenLDAP -

<http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/library/l-radius/> Linux Magazine Article on
RADIUS and 802.1X - https://www.linux-magazine.com/issue/52/Freeradius_802.1X.pdf

RFC 2865 RADIUS - <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2865.txt> RFC 2866 - RADIUS

Accounting - <http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2866.html>