



**In-Depth Analysis of Microsoft Office PowerPoint LinkedSlideAtom10 Integer Overflow Vulnerability (CVE-2009-0221)**

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## Introduction

A vulnerability exists in Microsoft Office PowerPoint in the way it parses a specially crafted Powerpoint presentation, which could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code.

## Tested Versions

The vulnerability was analysed on Windows XP SP2 with Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 SP3 (Powerpnt.exe version 11.0.8227.0).

## Fixed Versions

The vulnerability was addressed with the MS09-017 patch.

## Technical Details

A Powerpoint document may embed containers like Handout, MainMaster, Notes or Slides to record data used in the different parts of the presentation. Each of these four containers can contain several atoms, some of them being optional.

An integer overflow vulnerability may be triggered due to insufficient checks performed on the LinkedSlideAtom10 (opcode 12007 or 2EE7h) which is an optional atom belonging to the quoted containers.

The vulnerable code is located in sub\_300072AA, reached from sub\_3009A622 which parses the different atoms found in a container:

```
.text:301E3A0D loc_301E3A0D:
.text:301E3A0D      cmp     ax, 2EE7h           //LinkedSlideAtom10
.text:301E3A11      jnz    short loc_301E3A59
.text:301E3A13      mov     ecx, [ebp+14h]
.text:301E3A16      push   8
.text:301E3A18      call   sub_3009C88B        //get two parameters
.text:301E3A1D      push   14h
.text:301E3A1F      mov     ebx, eax
.text:301E3A21      call   sub_30004D65        //allocate a 14 bytes long buffer
.text:301E3A26      mov     esi, eax
.text:301E3A28      mov     [ebp-5Ch], esi
.text:301E3A2B      mov     eax, [ebx+4]       //eax = size parameter of LinkedSlideAtom10
.text:301E3A2E      mov     ecx, [ebx]        //ecx = slideIndex parameter
.text:301E3A30      xor     ebx, ebx
.text:301E3A32      push   ebx
.text:301E3A33      push   ebx
.text:301E3A34      push   eax                //push size
.text:301E3A35      mov     [esi], ecx
.text:301E3A37      push   8                 //this number is used later in a multiplication
.text:301E3A39      lea    ecx, [esi+4]
.text:301E3A3C      mov     dword ptr [ebp-4], 6
.text:301E3A43      call   sub_3001E0B0        //call to a function that calls the vulnerable
                                //sub_300072AA function
```

Then, in the vulnerable function:

```
.text:300072AA      push   ebp
.text:300072AB      mov     ebp, esp
.text:300072AD      cmp     [ebp+arg_4], 1     //arg_4 is set to 1
.text:300072B1      push   ebx
.text:300072B2      push   esi
.text:300072B3      push   edi
.text:300072B4      mov     esi, ecx
.text:300072B6      jbe    loc_3001E11D
```

```

...
.text:3001E11D loc_3001E11D:
.text:3001E11D      mov     ebx, [ebp+arg_0]    //ebx = size parameter of LinkedSlideAtom10

.text:3001E120      jmp     loc_300072CC
...
.text:300072CC
.text:300072CC loc_300072CC:
.text:300072CC      mov     esi, [esi+0Ch]     //[esi+0Ch] = 8
.text:300072CF      imul   esi, ebx
.text:300072D2      push   esi
.text:300072D3      call   sub_30004D65       //allocate a new buffer
    
```

The problem lies in the allocation of this buffer. If ebx is large enough (I.e. when ebx >= 20000000h) the multiplication overflows which results in an undersized buffer allocated.

This buffer is later used to hold data stored in the LinkedShapeAtom10 atoms that normally follow a LinkedSlideAtom10 atom. If enough atoms are provided, a heap overflow occurs leading to arbitrary code execution.

**Exploitation**

The resulting crash eventually appears in Powerpnt.exe at 0x30021DF6:

```

.text:30021DF2      mov     eax, [ecx]        //[ecx] has been overwritten with data coming
                        //from a LinkedShapeAtom10 atom
.text:30021DF4      push   1
.text:30021DF6      call   dword ptr [eax+8] //eax controlled. It usually equals the linkedIndex
                        //parameter of a LinkedShapeAtom10 atom
    
```

The provided exploit uses a LinkedSlideAtom10 with a size set to 20000001h. Then a few LinkedShapeAtom10 atoms follow to overwrite the heap so that [eax+8] points to an arbitrary location. As one can see, data issued from the file can be found in the stack around offset 0x00132B50. The program then jumps there to finally execute the payload.

This exploit however requires the victim to open the file by double clicking.

**Detection**

A LinkedSlideAtom10 may belong to four different containers named Handout, MainMaster, Notes or Slides. All are normally found in the Powerpoint Document stream.

In all cases, a file must be regarded malicious provided the size parameter of a LinkedSlideAtom10 is higher than 1FFFFFFFh which is for instance the case on Figure 1.

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
4:37F0h:	0C	00	04	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	0C	00	00	00	.....															
4:3800h:	E7	2E	08	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	20	00	00	Ç..... ..															
4:3810h:	E6	2E	08	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	41	41	41	41	00	00	æ.....AAAA..															
4:3820h:	E6	2E	08	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	41	41	41	41	00	00	æ.....AAAA..															
4:3830h:	E6	2E	08	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	41	41	41	41	00	00	æ.....AAAA..															
4:3840h:	E6	2E	08	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	41	41	41	41	00	00	æ.....AAAA..															

Figure 1 – Malicious LinkedSlideAtom10

The malicious atom begins at offset 0x437FE. As one can see, 2EE7h stands for LinkedSlideAtom10. These atoms are normally 8 bytes long. Its first parameter is an index and the second represents the number of the LinkedShapeAtom atoms that follow. On Figure 1, this size equals 20000001h so this file is likely to trigger the vulnerability described here.

## **References**

VUPEN/ADV-2009-1290:

<http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2009/1290>

CVE-2009-0221:

<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-0221>

## **Changelog**

2009-05-20: Initial release